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1 Introduction
Matt and Abby are members of a jury for a murder case. They have all the same evidence
and review it separately. When they convene to discuss their conclusions, they discover
that they disagree. Matt is confident that Jones is innocent; Abby is confident that Jones
is guilty. When they learn of their disagreement, what do they discover about themselves?
Clearly, they learn that one of them is confident in a falsehood: Either Jones is guilty or
he isn’t. But do they also learn that one of them has been less than fully rational, that one
has failed to properly assimilate the evidence before him?
Proponents of Epistemic Uniqueness say yes: Given your total evidence, there is a
unique rational doxastic attitude that you can take to any proposition.1 Matt and Abby
have the same evidence, but have different levels of confidence in the proposition that Jones
is guilty (Guilty). Uniqueness entails that at most one of them is fully rational.
Proponents of Epistemic Permissivism say no. Matt and Abby may simply have
different standards of reasoning. For example, Matt may tend to favor simple hypotheses,
and Abby may tend to favor complex, more explanatory hypotheses. A permissivist thinks
both standards of reasoning may be perfectly rational even though they sanction very
different responses to the evidence.2
1This formulation is from White (2005).
2See Greco and Hedden (2015), Horowitz (2013), and White (2005) for arguments against versions of
Epistemic Permissivism. See Ballantyne and Coffman (2012), Douven (2009), Kelly (2014), Kopec (2015),
Meacham (2014), and Schoenfield (2014) for defenses. See Kopec and Titelbaum (2015) for an overview of
various arguments for and against.
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Permissivists paint a simple, attractive picture of rationality. There are some general,
justifiable rules—e.g., Conditionalization, Probabilism, and the Principal Principle—and
a wide range of permissible starting points. So long as you begin at one of these, and
you follow the rules, you’re doing fine. Permissivists charge that Uniquers paint a much
more complicated, and metaphysically loaded, picture of rationality.3 Uniquers must say
everything Permissivists say, and much more—that there is a unique rational starting point,
a unique rational credence in Guilty, and so forth.
I argue that Permissivists face a special challenge about the interaction between our first-
and higher-order attitudes. They claim that rationality often permits a range of credences
in a certain proposition. Yet given certain plausible assumptions about the relationship
between our first- and higher-order attitudes, you cannot adopt a credence on the edge of
that range. But Permissivism says that for some such range, any credence in that range is
rational. So Permissivism is false. I consider new ways of developing Permissivism to avoid
this argument, but they have problems of their own.4 Conclusion: Permissivism is not as
simple as advertised, and without new motivations, it’s not very attractive either.
On to the argument.
2 Dominance
Suppose that Permissivism is true and that Matt and Abby’s evidence rationalizes any
credence between, say, .3 and .7 in the proposition that Jones is guilty (Guilty). Quite
plausibly, Matt is not always in a position to discern the exact boundaries of the permissible
3See e.g., Schoenfield (2014) and Kelly (2014) for this criticism.
4Strictly speaking, someone could be a Permissivist yet deny that there is ever a range of permissible
credences in any proposition—you might think, say, that there are just two permissible credence in the
proposition that Jones is guilty, .3 and .7. But the standard motivations—that there are some general,
justifiable rules, and a wide range of starting points—strongly suggest that there will be a wide range of
permissible credences in most propositions. If the Permissivist denies this, she owes us a general story about
why there can never be such a range. Since no story like this has been told, I ignore this complication in
this paper.
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range.5 Compare: He isn’t able to determine the exact height of a tree some distance off
just by looking—his eyesight is nowhere near that good. Similarly, by reflection alone, he
can’t reliably determine the value of the upper and lower bounds of the permissible range
to the nearest (say) .01 degrees of confidence—the evidence is too complex, and his powers
of reasoning are nowhere near that good. Even if he truly believes that the lower bound is
.3, he’s merely guessing—for all he knows, the lower bound is .31 or .29. He can’t reliably
distinguish the actual case from one in which the lower bound is slightly higher or slightly
lower.
Matt ought to know this about himself. He ought to know that if he were to guess the
exact values of the upper and lower bound, he’d likely err. So, if the lower bound is .3, he
shouldn’t be certain that the lower bound is exactly .3. Compare: Since you know that you
can’t reliably guess the exact height of the tree some distance off, you shouldn’t be certain
that the tree is exactly 667 inches tall, even if it is—you should recognize that it might be
slightly taller or slightly shorter. Similarly, Matt should acknowledge that the lower bound
might well be slightly greater than .3.
So what should Matt believe about the boundaries of the permissible range? That, it
seems, depends on what they actually are. If the lower bound is actually .3, then he should
believe that it is between (say) .2 and .4—that is, he should believe that it is roughly .3.
For even though rational requirements are not wholly transparent to us, they shouldn’t be
completely opaque to those who reflect carefully. After all, we regard careful reflection on
our evidence as valuable precisely because it helps us form rational beliefs—beliefs that
better reflect the force of our evidence. If the requirements of rationality were wholly
inaccessible, what would justify such a practice?
So if Matt is rational, he believes that the permissible range of credences in Guilty spans
from roughly .3 to roughly .7.6 But if he believes that, it would be irrational for him to
5See e.g., Christensen (2010), Elga (2013), Horowitz (2014), and Williamson (2000) for sympathetic
discussion of similar claims.
6Note that this point is not specific to Permissivism. If Epistemic Uniqueness is true, and the unique
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adopt credence .3. Why? Because Matt is not certain that .3 is rational, but there are other
credences whose rationality Matt does not doubt—he is certain that (say) .5 is rational.
But when you are certain that a given credence is rational, it is irrational to adopt any
other credence that you are not certain is rational: It is irrational to adopt credences that
are, what I’ll call, weakly rationality dominated.
A bit more precisely. Let an evidential situation be a complete specification of which
credences are rational responses to one’s evidence. Then where c and c′ are credences that
a subject S might adopt,
Weak Rationality Dominance: c weakly rationality dominates c′ for S iff for every
evidential situation that S treats as a live option and in which c′ is rational, c is too,
and in some evidential situation that S treats as a live option, c is rational, but c′ is
not.
Matt believes that the lower bound is roughly .3. To believe that the lower bound is roughly
.3 is just to believe that it might be slightly higher or slightly lower than .3. Let’s make
a simplifying assumption that Matt treats three evidential situations as live options: that
the lower bound is .2, that it is .3, and that it is .4. In each of these evidential situations
in which it is rational to assign .3 to Guilty—i.e., when the lower bound is .2 or .3—it is
rational to assign .4 to Guilty. But in the evidential situation in which the lowest rational
credence is .4, assigning .4 to Guilty is rational, and assigning .3 to Guilty is not. Hence,
in some evidential situation that Matt treats as as a live option, assigning .4 to Guilty is
rational, but assigning .3 to Guilty is not. So assigning .3 to Guilty is weakly rationality
dominated by assigning .4 to Guilty for Matt.
But dominated options aren’t rational: It’s not rational to adopt a credence that’s risky
by your own lights when you know of a safer option. It follows that it is not rational for Matt
rational credence in Guilty is (say) .5, then Matt is not in a position to know that it is exactly .5, and so he
too should believe that the rational credence is roughly .5. In my reply to the first objection, I’ll show why
this does not pose problems for the proponent of Uniqueness. Thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing
this to my attention.
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to assign .3 to Guilty. But the Permissivist’s hypothesis was that it’s rationally permissible
to adopt any credence between .3 and .7. We’ve now contradicted that assumption. Given
what Matt ought to believe about the permissible range, it is irrational for Matt to adopt
a credence on the edge of that range.7
The argument generalizes. For any range of putatively permissible credences in a propo-
sition P, it is irrational to assign to P the lowest (highest) value in that range—that is, it
is irrational to adopt any credence on the edge of the permissible range.8 But Permis-
sivism says that there is some range such that any credence in that range is permissible.
Contradiction.9
(Perhaps you wonder why we should care about rationality dominance: Our ultimate
epistemic goal is not rationality per se but accuracy. Even if we grant this, we ought to
recognize that epistemic rationality is a good guide to accuracy—in general, more rational
credences are more accurate. On this view, we should avoid credences that are rationality
dominated because we should do what we can to be most accurate. I return to this issue
in my reply to Objection 5.10)
In the remainder of the paper, I explore various objections to my argument and find them
wanting. The upshot is that Permissivism faces a special challenge about the interaction
between our first- and higher-order attitudes. Answering the challenge requires taking on
7I should note the dominance argument does not apply to an extreme version of Subjective Bayesianism
that says that we are rationally required to follow the Bayesian formal constraints—probabilistic coherence
and conditionalization—but there are no other constraints on what our priors should look like. Why? If any
probabilistically coherent prior is permissible, the range of permissible credences in (almost) any proposition
will be [0,1]—any credence will be rationally permissible. And if that’s right, we can be sure that our
credences are rational, and so they won’t be weakly rationality dominated. But for many, this extreme
version of Subjective Bayesianism will seem too permissive. (It doesn’t rule out counter-inductivists, for
example.) My argument targets any moderate Permissivist—that is, any Permissivist who wants to carve
out a space between (extreme) Subjective Bayesianism and Uniqueness.
8I’m simplifying here. If it is impermissible to take dominated options, then it will be irrational to
adopt any credence that is close enough to the edge that you believe that it might fall just outside of the
permissible range. This means that the argument goes through even if the range of permissible credences
has no lowest or highest value.
9The Permissivist might object that I oversell the force of the dominance argument. If the range of
permissible credences in Guilty is narrow, so narrow that Matt is not certain that any particular credence
is rational, then his .3 credence in Guilty will not be rationality dominated. Granted. But the Permissivist
shouldn’t rest content. For the guiding motivations for Epistemic Permissivism—e.g., that different people
can rationally come to opposite conclusions about an issue—strongly suggest that the permissible range of
credences will often be very wide. See Rosen (2001) and Schoenfield (2014).
10Thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing this to my attention.
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new, unattractive commitments about how we form higher-order beliefs or about what it
is permissible to do in the face of higher-order uncertainty. Perhaps we will conclude in the
end that those commitments are worth carrying to save Permissivism. But if we do accept
Permissivism, we should do so with clear eyes. We should know what burdens we shoulder.
3 Objections and Replies
Objection 1 : Your argument exploits the vagueness of epistemic permissibility. It relies on
the premise that if a certain credence is not rational, then no credence sufficiently close to
it is rational, either. But any premise of that form is soritical, and so ought to be rejected.
Reply : That premise is indeed soritical, but my argument doesn’t rely on it. I do not say
that since .3 is irrational, so too is .31. If my argument did rely on this premise, it would
have the (absurd) consequence that there are no rational credences. But it has no such
consequence.
To see this, take the limiting case, where there is just one permissible credence in
Guilty—say, .5. If .5 is the unique rational credence in Guilty, then Matt ought to believe
that it is roughly .5 (reflection doesn’t get us all the way to the truth, but it gets us
somewhere). Now, if Matt believes that the rational credence is roughly .5, then if he
assigns .5 to Guilty, he won’t be certain that his own credence is rational. But that’s
not itself irrational: Although Matt is not certain that his credence is rational, he is not
certain, of any particular credence, that it is rational. There is no other credence Matt
thinks would be better than his own.11 When the rationality of everything is in doubt,
11Christensen (2010) gives an example of what seems to be a fully rational agent who is uncertain about
what the rational credence is. Ava is considering the possibility that the next US President will be a
Democrat (D). On page 121, Christensen says, ‘Ava gives D some particular crednece, say, .7; this reflects
a great deal of her general knowledge, her feel for public opinion, her knowledge of possible candidates,
etc. But given the possibility that her credence is affected by wishful thinking, protective pessimism, or
just failure to focus on and perfectly integrate an unruly mass of evidence, Ava very much doubts that her
credence is exactly what her evidence supports. This seems only natural; indeed, eminently reasonable.’
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assigning .5 credence to Guilty will not be rationality dominated for Matt. Like clear-eyed
Permissivists, clear-eyed Uniquers are uncertain about the rationality of their credences;
unlike clear-eyed Permissivists, they are not sure that any other credences are rational.
(By ‘clear-eyed Permissivist’, I mean someone who believes, of a certain case, that it is a
permissive one. By ‘clear-eyed Uniquer’, I mean someone who believes that there are no
permissive cases.)
The dominance argument works against Permissivism because if there is a wide range of
credences, Matt can be sure that certain credences in the middle of the range are rational—
being in the middle will be safer, by Matt’s lights, than being on the edge. But if you think
there’s just one rational credence, nothing will be perfectly safe by your lights. Matt may
assign .5 credence to Guilty because this credence will not be rationality dominated by any
other credence.
Objection 2 : Ideally rational agents know exactly what rationality permits. So, in particu-
lar, if Matt is ideally rational, he is certain that the permissible range of credences in Guilty
spans from exactly .3 to exactly .7, and so he is no victim of the dominance argument.
Reply : Maybe.12 But Epistemic Permissivism is not just a view about ideally rational
agents, but about ordinary agents like you and me, with all our human limitations. Indeed,
Permissivists often tout their view as the only alternative to an objectionably demanding
epistemology. Try to imagine yourself in Matt’s shoes, they say. You’re faced with a mess of
evidence. Jones’ glove was found on the scene, but another suspect’s fingerprints were there
too. Three witnesses claim that Jones owned a gun and was prone to violence. Two others
12Why ‘maybe’? Because it isn’t clear that even ideally rational agents are certain about which credences
are licensed by their evidence. Here’s one reason to think they aren’t. Ideally rational agents aren’t always in
a position to know exactly what they know. In particular, knowledge does not obey negative introspection:
Ideally rational agents can fail to know P without also knowing that they don’t know P . But if we accept,
following Williamson (2000), that our evidence just is our knowledge, then even ideally rational agents won’t
know exactly what their evidence is—sometimes they will be rationally uncertain about which credences
are rational.
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deny this. And so on. Could it really be that the only rational response to his evidence
is for Matt to become (say) .6453 confident in Guilty? Surely not, the Permissivist says.
Rationality does not require us to do the impossible—typically there is a wide range of
responses to our evidence that would be rational.13
If the Permissivist embraces this motivation, then surely when she says that it is permis-
sible to hold any credence between .3 and .7, she means that it is permissible for someone
like Matt—a non-ideal, cognitively limited agent—to hold any credence between .3 and .7.
But I’ve argued that this can’t be. A non-ideal agent ought not to be certain of the exact
boundaries of the permissible range, so he cannot adopt a credence on the edge of that
range.
But even if the Permissivist eschews this motivation, I don’t think she’s much better
off. To be sure, the dominance argument does not apply to those who are certain of the
exact boundaries of the permissible range. So, for any credence between .3 and .7 in Guilty,
perhaps there is an ideally rational agent who holds that credence. But the argument still
applies to ordinary agents—their options will be much more constrained. This leaves us
with quite a surprising account of rationality, one that affords ideally rational agents many,
many options, and limits ordinary agents to just one.
This is exactly the opposite of what we should expect from a Permissivist who recognizes
a distinction between ideal and non-ideal rationality. Permissivism is populist epistemology,
a view for ordinary folk. Impermissivists ignore the realities of our actual cognitive lives.
Permissivists don’t. If the Permissivist grants that any form of rationality is impermissive, it
should be an idealized notion, one that abstracts away from our actual cognitive limitations,
and so, by their lights, has little relevance for people like us. Absent a suitable story about
why things would be reversed—why it would be ideal rationality that is permissive and
non-ideal rationality that is impermissive—we should be suspicious of an appeal to ideal
13See e.g., Schoenfield (2014) for arguments like this.
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rationality as a way of evading the dominance argument.
Objection 3 : Matt should believe that he is in the middle of the permissible range. Suppose
we grant that it is impermissible to adopt dominated options. Then we must say that, if he
believes that the boundary of the permissible range is roughly .3, it is irrational for Matt to
be .3 confident in Guilty. Matt shouldn’t regard himself as taking an unnecessary risk. But
that doesn’t mean the .3 credence has to go, as I’ve argued. Rather, it’s Matt’s higher-order
beliefs that should change: Matt should believe that his .3 credence is close to the middle
of the range of permissible credences in Guilty, so that he is certain that .3 is rational.
Reply : If you take this strategy, you need a story about how we form higher-order beliefs
that explains why agents on the edge of the permissible range must always believe falsely
that they are (roughly) in the middle. To be sure, agents can form false beliefs about what
rationality permits if they have misleading higher-order evidence. Matt may get misleading
higher-order evidence suggesting that the permissible range of credences in Guilty spans
from roughly .1 to roughly .5. I don’t doubt that it would then be permissible for him
to assign .3 to Guilty. But Epistemic Permissivism is not just a view about what we are
permitted to believe when we are misled. We need an account of how we form higher-order
beliefs that explains how it can be rational for agents on the edge to believe falsely that
they are in the middle, even in the absence of misleading higher-order evidence.
The kind of story about higher-order belief formation that we are interested in is one
that tells Matt and Abby to believe that they are in the middle of the permissible range. So,
since Matt assigns .3 to Guilty, he ought to believe that the range of permissible credences
in Guilty is roughly .1-.5, and since Abby assigns .7 to Guilty, she ought to believe that the
range of permissible credences is roughly .5-.9. What kind of method must Matt and Abby
be using to form these higher-order beliefs? It must be one that takes into account their
own credences in Guilty.
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Perhaps the story goes like this. In general, you are rationally entitled to believe that
your own credences and beliefs are rational. So, when Matt examines the evidence and
adopts .3, he is thereby permitted to infer that .3 is rational. Similarly, when Abby examines
the evidence and adopts .7 credence, she is thereby permitted to believe that .7 is rational.
Now, the story can’t stop there, for since Matt and Abby are clear-eyed Permissivists, they
think other credences are rational, too. Which ones? A natural thought: Those that are
sufficiently close to their own! Matt reasons, ‘I know that .3 is rational. So any credence
as low as .1 or as high as .5 is probably rational, too’, and Abby reasons, ‘I know that .7
is rational, so anything as low as .5 and as high as .9 is rational, too.’ Can this procedure
explain how Matt and Abby could rationally believe that they are in the middle of the
range?
I think not. For if your credence is sufficiently close to the edge, this procedure will
lead you astray about the upper and lower bounds of the permissible range, as it does for
Matt and Abby. Now, the unreliability of the method is not itself the problem—perhaps
we are sometimes rational to use unreliable methods. What’s worrying is that a clear-eyed
Permissivist is in a position to know that the method is unreliable.
To see why, it will be instructive to compare Permissivism to Uniqueness on this issue.
Suppose that I am a clear-eyed Uniquer. In that case, I know that, if my first-order belief or
credence is rational, then if I come to believe that my own credence is rational, my belief will
be true. In short, if Uniqueness is true, then the rational entitlement principle guarantees
that rational agents will form true beliefs about rationality, and clear-eyed Uniquers are in
a position to rationally believe this about themselves.
Things are different for Permissivism. Matt is a clear-eyed Permissivist. He believes
that his credence in Guilty is rational and infers that all credences close to his are rational.
That’s how Matt comes to believe that the range of permissible credences in Guilty is
roughly .1 to roughly .5. But although being rational guarantees that you will form true
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beliefs about the rationality of your own credence, it does not guarantee that you will form
true beliefs about the upper and lower bounds of the permissible range of credences—it
doesn’t guarantee that you will form true beliefs about what other credences are rational.
But Matt in a position to know this about the method he is using. Matt should be highly
confident that he is on the edge of the permissible range of credences in some propositions,
and for all he knows, Guilty is one of them. So, Matt should recognize that, for all he knows,
his credence is on the edge of the range of permissible credences in Guilty. Matt should
doubt the conclusion of the method he is using: He should think, ‘Even if my credence in
Guilty is rational, I might be on the edge of the permissible range, in which case my belief
that all credences close to my own are rational will be false!’ But it can’t be rational to
use a method whose conclusions one doubts. If I am in a position to know a priori that a
conclusion I’ve drawn might be false, I shouldn’t believe it. Pending a suitable story about
higher-order belief formation, we ought to be suspicious of a view that says that we must
always believe that our credences are close to the middle of the permissible range.
Objection 4 : You assume that if Permissivism is true, then Matt can rationally believe
he is in a permissive case. But some Permissivists deny this. For example, Stewart Cohen
(2013) is a Permissivist who defends Doxastic Uniqueness, the claim that a subject
cannot rationally hold one credence while believing that some other credence is just as
rational. That is, a subject can never rationally believe that she is in a permissive case. If
Matt doesn’t believe that there is a range of permissible credences in Guilty, the threat of
dominance evaporates.
Reply : Granted. But the traditional motivations for Permissivism strongly suggest that if
Permissivism is true, then we can, at least sometimes, rationally believe that we are in a
permissive case.14
14See Ballantyne and Coffman (2011), Douven (2009), Kelly (2013), Schoenfield (2014), and Titelbaum
and Kopec (2015) for defenses of clear-eyed Permissivism, the view that Permissivism true and we’re
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Permissivist usually motivate their view, at least in part, by reflection on particular
cases—cases of disagreement among jurors about whether Jones is guilty, among paleontol-
ogists about what killed off the dinosaurs, and among philosophers about whether we have
free will. But if we can know that a particular case is permissive when we’re doing epis-
temology, what could stop us from continuing to know that a particular case is permissive
when we’re in one?
A second way of motivating Permissivism, the ‘competing theoretical virtues’ argument,
also suggests that we often know that we’re in a permissive case. Permissivists say that
what it’s rational for us to believe depends not just on the content of our evidence, but
on how we balance certain theoretical virtues against each other—things like simplicity,
predictive strength, and explanatory power. There are many different, yet equally rational
ways of balancing these virtues against one another, and they will often yield different levels
of confidence in various hypotheses.15
But surely we can tell, at least sometimes, how simple, predictive, and explanatory a
certain hypothesis is. If we can, then we can also determine, say, that balancing simplicity
and predictive power in this way would yield high credence in Guilty, and weighing them
in that way would yield lower credence in Guilty. But if we also know that both of these
ways of balancing the theoretical virtues are rational, we can put two and two together,
and conclude that high credence and low credence in Guilty are both rational.16
Objection 5 : It can be permissible for Matt to hold onto a credence that is rationality
dominated. Matt’s credence has something else going for it: He expects it to be most
accurate. Why? Because Matt’s credence is recommended by his own epistemic standards,
which he endorses: Matt expects the credences recommended by his standards to be more
accurate than those recommended by any other standards.
sometimes in a position to know, of a certain case, that it is permissive.
15See, for example, Douven (2009), Schoenfield (2014), and Titelbaum (2015a) for arguments along these
lines.
16Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this point.
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This argument is not new: It’s Schoenfield’s (2014) response to White’s (2005) charge
that if Permissivism is true, then it should be fine to arbitrarily switch from one permissible
credence to another.17 We can think of Schoenfield’s brand of Permissivism as a kind
of Intrapersonal Epistemic Uniqueness: There are many, equally permissible sets of
epistemic standards, but once you’ve settled on one, you have reason to adopt the credences
your standards recommend. (For Schoenfield, that’s because if you’re rational, you expect
your standards to maximize expected accuracy.) 18 So, contra White, it is never rational
to arbitrarily switch from one permissible credence to another.
If we’re convinced by Schoenfield’s reply to White’s, might we use it to reply to my
challenge as well?
Reply : There are two ways of understanding Schoenfield’s reply on behalf of the Intrap-
ersonal Epistemic Uniquer, one weaker, one stronger: the weaker, though plausibly an
effective response to White’s challenge, is no objection to mine; the stronger is indeed an
objection to the dominance principle, but, intuitively, it is far too strong.19
The weaker version of Schoenfield’s reply says that expecting some credence to be most
accurate is sometimes a reason to prefer it—in particular, it is a reason to prefer it when the
rationality of the various credences you’re considering is not in doubt. This is the thought
that in fact motivates Schoenfield’s reply to White above (see footnote 21). Plausibly,
Schoenfield has answered White’s challenge—she has explained why, when you know that
some other credence is just as rational as yours, you still have reason to prefer your own.
But the weaker version of Schoenfield’s reply does not help the Permissivist answer my
challenge—she does not (nor does she intend to) explain why it would be permissible to
hold onto credences that are rationality dominated. After all, cases in which your credence
17White presents many arguments against Permissivism, but I take this to be the central objection
unifying all of them.
18Kelly (2014), Meacham (2014), and Titelbaum and Kopec (2015) also defend Intrapersonal Uniqueness,
and discuss how this view helps us respond to White.
19Thanks to Bernhard Salow for discussion on the arguments of this section.
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is rationality dominated are precisely those cases in which the rationality of one of the
credences you are considering is in doubt.
The stronger version of Schoenfield’s reply says that expecting your credence to be most
accurate is always a reason to prefer it—in particular, it is a reason to prefer it even when
the rationality of that credence is in doubt. This is is indeed an objection to the dominance
principle, the principle that it is always irrational to adopt weakly dominated credences.
The stronger version of Schoenfield’s reply says that you should stick to your credence when
it is rationality dominated because you expect it to be most accurate.
But it’s not an objection the Permissivist should be happy to pursue. It implies that
we should never be moved to revise our credences by evidence that we’ve been less than
fully rational; instead we should level-split—e.g., we should both remain highly confident
that Jones is not guilty and believe that our evidence supports lower confidence in this
proposition. This is not a welcome consequence. Those who refuse to revise their beliefs
in the face of evidence that they are irrational seem over-confident, indeed dogmatic—they
seem paradigmatically irrational.
Suppose Jill has examined all of the evidence and becomes highly confident that the
Warriors, her favorite NBA team, will win the championship. A trusted friend tells her
that she always overestimates the likelihood of favorable outcomes. The Permissivist we’re
considering says that Jill should remain highly confident that the Warriors will win despite
her friend’s warning. Since she expects her high credence to be most accurate, she needn’t
be worried by evidence that she’s been irrational.
This doesn’t seem right. When she has reason to believe her credence is irrational,
Jill shouldn’t be able to appeal to the perceived accuracy of her credence as a reason to
hold onto it. Compare this to a case of all-out beliefs. Suppose that Jill simply believes
that the Warriors will win, and her friend tells that the evidence doesn’t support such high
confidence. Jill couldn’t reply to her friend’s concern: ‘Well, I must have gotten lucky—even
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though the evidence supports lower confidence, I’ve wound up with a true belief!’20 Return
to the case of credences. Jill can’t respond to her friend’s concern about the rationality
of her credence with: ‘Well, I must have gotten lucky—even though my evidence supports
a lower credence, my credence is more accurate!’ Evidence that she has been irrational
should make her doubt the accuracy of her credences and beliefs, and she should lower her
confidence accordingly.
Similar things can be said of Matt’s credence in Guilty. He worries that his credence
might be too low. But he’s sure that it’s not too high—he’s certain that it would be rational
to assign .4 to Guilty. The Permissivist we’re considering says that he needn’t be moved by
doubts about the rationality of his .3 credence in Guilty because he expects it to be most
accurate. But again, this seems wrong. Matt cannot appeal to the perceived accuracy of
his credence as a reason to maintain that credence when its rationality is in doubt.21
This is connected to a worry I mentioned earlier: Don’t rational agents care rationality
only as a guide to accuracy, and not for its own sake? If so, accuracy always comes first. But
then my dominance principle is false: Because he expects his credence to be more accurate
than any other credence, Matt should stick with .3 even if he isn’t sure it is rational and
he is sure that (say) .4 is rational. To shift from .3 to .4 in order to ensure rationality—at
the cost of accuracy by Matt’s lights—would be irrational.
But I deny that it can be rational for Matt to expect his credence to be most accurate
when he has reason to believe that his credence might be irrational, and he is sure that some
other credence is rational. If Matt were sure that his credence is rational, then perhaps
20For defenses or sympathetic discussion of the claim that it is irrational to maintain some credence or
belief when you acquire evidence that it is irrational, see Christensen (2010), Elga (2013), Greco (2014),
Horowitz (2014), Sliwa and Horowitz (2015), Smithies (2012), and Titelbaum (2015b). For criticism see
Coates (2012), Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), Lasonen-Aarnio (2015), and Williamson (2011).
21It is Schoenfield’s discussion of irrelevant influences on belief that makes explicit that she endorses
only the weaker version of Intrapersonal Uniqueness. She’s interested in cases where you learn that your
belief was influenced by an irrelevant factor. In cases like this, it seems we should revise our earlier beliefs.
Schoenfield explains this intuition by saying that we should revise our beliefs when we have reason to believe
that they are irrational. (See pages 203-206.) Schoenfield accepts that if you have evidence that you’ve
picked standards in a way that was unlikely to leave you with rational ones, then you ought to change them.
It’s a short step from this thought to my dominance principle.
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it would be rational for him to expect it to be most accurate. But the moment he starts
doubting the rationality of his credence, continuing to assume that it is most accurate seems
overly self-confident and dogmatic.
Even if we don’t care about rationality for its own sake, it is a good guide to accuracy—
in general, more rational credences are more accurate than less rational ones. But then we
ought to see it that way—if we expect one credence to be more rational than another, we
should also expect it to be more accurate, and so we should prefer it. Since Matt expects
.4 to be more rational than .3—he’s sure that .4 is rational but he is not sure that .3 is—he
should also expect .4 to be more accurate than .3, and Matt should revise his credence
accordingly. On this view, avoiding dominated credences is just part of doing what we can
to be most accurate.
Let’s take a step back. As we’ve seen, I’m not the first to object to Permissivism. White
argued that if you know that you’re in a permissive case, then it is okay to arbitrarily switch
credences. As we saw in Objection 4, some Permissivists simply deny that we ever know
that we are in a permissive case, and such Permissivists escape my dominance argument.
But the Permissivists who endorse the traditional motivations for the view—e.g., com-
peting theoretical virtues—say that you can know that you are in a permissive case, but
it is nonetheless not okay to arbitrarily switch. These Permissivists must say that rational
agents have some to reason privilege their own credences even when they know that some
other credence is just as rational. Perhaps that reason is that the standards of a ratio-
nal agent maximize expected accuracy for that agent, as Schoenfield argues. Or perhaps
it’s simply that we should be (diachronically) consistent; we shouldn’t change our minds
arbitrarily.22
But whatever the reason is, we must ask the question that I asked in response to Schoen-
22See Titelbaum and Kopec (2015) for a discussion of how appealing to certain norms of diachronic
consistency helps us reply to White.
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field: What is the force of the reason? Do we always have reason to adopt the credences
that our standards recommend? Or rather, can it be defeated by evidence that our cre-
dences (and so our standards, too) are irrational? As we’ve seen, the Permissivist should
accept that if you have reason to believe that your standards are irrational, then whatever
reason you had to adhere to your standards is defeated—when the rationality of a certain
credence is in doubt, that it is recommended by your standards is no reason to prefer it.
It is a far cry from the thought that you shouldn’t change your mind arbitrarily to the
thought that you shouldn’t change your mind even when you have reason to believe that
your present attitude is irrational. But I have argued that this is the predicament of the
clear-eyed Permissivist on the edge of the permissible range. It’s not that he believes that
some other credence is just as rational as his. No, it’s that he expects some other credence
to be more rational than his. (Matt is sure that .5 is rational but he is not sure that .3 is
rational.) To privilege your credence when the rationality of that credence is not in doubt
is one thing; to do so when you have reason to believe it might be irrational, and you’re
sure that some other credence is rational, is quite another.
The dominance argument goes through so long as you admit that it is rational to revise
your credences when you’re not sure that your credence is rational but you are sure that
some other credence is rational. And any Permissivist should admit this much.
4 Conclusion
I’ve argued that if you are on the edge of the permissible range of credences in a certain
proposition, your credence will be rationality dominated by certain credences closer to the
middle. Since dominated options aren’t rational, it’s not rational to adopt a credence on
the edge of the permissible range. But Permissivism says that, for some such range, any
credence in that range is rationally permissible. I have considered some objections to my
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argument and found them wanting. Permissivism, in its traditional form, cannot be right.23
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